Ambiguity Attitude, R&D Investments and Economic Growth by G. Cozzi & P. Giordani
Ambiguity Attitude, R&D Investments and
Economic Growth
Guido Cozziy Paolo E. Giordaniz
University of Glasgow LUISS "Guido Carli" University
Abstract
The process aimed at discovering new ideas is an economic activity whose
returns are intrinsically uncertain. In a standard neo-Schumpeterian growth
framework we assume that, when deciding upon R&D e¤orts, economic agents
hold ambiguous beliefsabout the exact probability of arrival of the next ver-
tical innovations, and face ambiguity via the  MEU decision rule (Ghirardato
et al. (2004)). Along the steady-state equilibrium the higher the agentsambi-
guity aversion (), the lower the R&D e¤orts and, coeteris paribus, the overall
economic performance. Consistently with a cross-country empirical evidence,
this causal mechanism suggests that, together with the protability conditions
of the economy, di¤erent culturalattitudes towards ambiguity may contribute
to explain the di¤erent R&D intensities observed across countries.
Keywords: Schumpeterian growth, ambiguity, cultural attitude towards
Ambiguity, arrival rate of innovation, R&D investments.
JEL Classication: 032, 041, D81, Z1.
The authors would like to thank the seminar participants at the European University Insitute and
at the University of Rome La Sapienza. Paolo Giordani thankfully acknowledges nancial support
from the Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies (EUI).
yDepartment of Economics, University of Glasgow. Tel.: +44(0)141 330 6603. E-mail:
g.cozzi@lbss.gla.ac.uk.
zDepartment of Economics, LUISS "Guido Carli" University, Viale Romania 32, 00197 Rome
(Italy). Tel.: +39 0685225912. E-Mail: pgiordani@luiss.it.
1
1 Introduction
Investment decisions in R&D are mostly taken under conditions of strong uncertainty
(Knight, 1921) on their expected returns: Innovations are in fact unique events, and
the process aimed at producing them is - both by logic and by historical inspection -
an intrinsically uncertain economic activity. In the words of Nathan Rosenberg (1994,
p. 93) the essential feature of technological innovation is that it is an activity that
is fraught with many uncertainties. This uncertainty, by which I mean an inability
to predict the outcome of the search process, or to predetermine the most e¢ cient
path to some particular goal, has a very important implication: the activity cannot
be planned. The importance of uncertainty in R&D decision-making is also largely
conrmed by the empirical evidence on rm behavior1. If uncertainty pervades the
decision setting for R&D investments, then the economic agentsattitude towards un-
certainty is crucial to understand in more depth the nature and the characteristics of
the innovation process.
Strong uncertainty plays no role in innovation-driven growth theory. The assump-
tion of a perfectly assessable investment horizon - that is, the idea that transparent
and well-organized nancial markets allow savers to nance R&D activity in the light
of an expected discounted value of future returns revealedby an e¢ cient stock mar-
ket - is in fact standard along such models as Romer (1990), Aghion and Howitt
(1992), Grossman and Helpman (1991) and subsequent developments. In particular, in
Schumpeterian growth theory (SGT) the Schumpeters view of economic development,
as spurred by incessant R&D races aimed at gaining monopoly prots, is incorpo-
rated into an Arrow-Debreu dynamic general equilibrium framework with measurable
uncertainty(risk).
In SGT the arrival of innovation in the economy is usually formalized via a Poisson
process. The parameter of this process, representing the ow probabilityof innovation,
is constant and perfectly known by R&D rms. In particular, in the original framework
developed by Aghion and Howitt (1992), the value of this parameter (), a¤ects both
the problem of whether or not to invest in R&D (whose solution is embodied by the
arbitrage equation), and the problem of whether to invest in risk-free assets or in
shares of monopolistic rms (whose solution is embodied by the asset equation).
In this framework we remove the assumption of a rigorously calculable future,
1See, among the others, Freeeman and Soete (1997), Chapter 10.
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and provide a rst attempt to formally introduce strong uncertainty (or, as we will
see, ambiguity) in the process describing the evolution of innovation. In particular, we
allow for the trueow probability of innovation t to change over time and consider
the existence of investors holding ambiguous beliefs about the exact value of that
probability. We refound the basic Schumpeterian framework in the light of this new
assumption, and consider the representative agent facing the two decision problems
recalled above via the  MEU decision rule (Hurwicz (1951), Ghirardato et al. (2004)).
In the steady-state equilibrium the amount of resources devoted to R&D, and hence
the expected balanced growth path, crucially depend upon the way agents face the
ambiguity in the arrival of innovation. In particular, the higher the ambiguity aversion
of the representative agent (as measured by the coe¢ cient ), the lower the equilibrium
R&D e¤orts.
We propose a cultural intepretationof the causal mechanism - going from ambigu-
ity attitude to R&D investments - highlighted in the paper. If we interpret the attitude
towards uncertainty as a country-specic cutural trait - as Hofstede (2001) does, when
building the uncertainty avoidance index for a number of countries (see next Section
and the Appendix) -, our theoretical result suggests to expect that, coeteris paribus,
countries where citizens show a high tolerence for ambiguity are more involved in in-
novative activity and viceversa. This is indeed what we nd in the empirical evidence
shown in Section 2.
This paper aims at extending a standard Schumpeterian framework in order to ac-
count for the lack of information characterizing the returns on R&D investments. On
the one hand, in proving the robustness of this theoretical framework to the investors
strong uncertainty, it can be interpreted as an attempt to overcome the concern ex-
pressed by Rosenberg (1994, p. 93) - namely that the activity cannot be planned
- through the theory of decision-making under ambiguity. On the other hand, and
consistently with the empirical evidence shown in the next Section, the mechanism
theoretically highlighted in it suggests that, together with the protability conditions
of the R&D sectors, di¤erent cultural attitudes towards uncertainty across countries
may contribute to explain the di¤erences in the R&D intensities observed among them.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In the next Section we show the em-
pirical evidence on the relationship between a measure of tolerance towards uncertainty
and R&D investments. In Section 3 we briey recall the two concepts of ambiguity and
ambiguity attitude. In Section 4 we provide a reminder of the simplest Schumpeterian
framework, which we then use in Section 5 to determine the steady-state equilibrium
3
R&D e¤orts under ambiguity. In Section 6 we develop the welfare analysis.
2 Empirical Evidence
Consistently with the causal mechanism highlighted in the model we observe, across
OECD countries, a negative correlation2 between di¤erent measures of the innovative
activity (R&D expenditure or number of researchers) and the uncertainty avoidance
index (UAI), which measures the extent to which the members of a culture feel
threatened by uncertain or unknown situations3 (Hofstede (2001)). Figures 1 and 2
show this correlation using respectively average R&D intensities or R&D researchers
over the last ten years.
Shane (1993) has estimated the impact of di¤erent cultural values on the national
rates of innovation across 33 countries. The cultural values he has considered are
those developed by Hofstede (1980, 2001): uncertainty avoidance, power distance,
masculinity and power distance; the national rate of innovation is measured by the
number of trademarks. After controlling for the industrial structure and the GDP per
capita across countries, Shane nds that the most (and always) signicant explanatory
variable is the uncertainty avoidance index: coeteris paribus, the lower the UAI the
higher the number of trademarks issued by a country.
Another recent empirical contribution along these lines is Huang (2006), who shows
that the di¤erent levels of tolerance towards ambiguity across countries, as measured
by UAI, are responsible for the di¤erent growth rates that we observe in the most
innovative industrial sectors of these countries: the empirical analysis suggests that
these sectors, usually characterized by relatively more informational opacity(that is,
by more vague information about their returns), grow much more slowly (rapidly) in
countries with relatively higher (lower) levels of UAI. This conclusion indirectly sup-
ports our claim that R&D employment, reasonably associated with the most innovative
sectors of the economy, is negatively a¤ected by ambiguity aversion.
2Across European countries the negative correlation is even stronger.
3The UAI is a broad measure of the country-specic cultural attitude towards uncertainty, built
by interviewing 88000 IBM employees across more than 70 countries. See the appendix for a detailed
description of the index, and for the connection between this index and ambiguity aversion.
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3 Ambiguity and Ambiguity Attitude
Ambiguity is to be intended in the sense that, given a typical uncertain choice scenario,
the decision makers (DM) information about feasible states of nature is too vague to
be represented by a - single, additive - probability measure. Ambiguity attitude refers
to the DMs reaction in the face of that ambiguity: that reaction can in fact be of
either aversion or attraction (and, of course, of di¤erent degrees of either of them) to
the ambiguity the DM perceives.
Ellsberg (1961) was the rst one to show, through a mind experiment (known as the
Ellsberg Paradox4), the incompatibility between a reasonableand widespread choice
in his experiment and the one dictated by the SEU principle (Savage (1954)), which
represents the standard treatment of decision making under uncertainty in economics.
The paradox emphasizes that people tend to make a distinction between clear (objec-
tive) probabilities and vague (subjective) probabilities, an argument which reminds of
the old Keynesian distinction between probabilityand weight of evidence5 (Keynes
(1921)). Schmeidler (1989) and Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989) gave a rst axiomatic
formalization to the idea of ambiguity via respectively two di¤erent extensions of the
SEU theory: the rst, called CEU (Choquet expected utility), basically replaces the
additive probability measure with a non-additive one (a capacity) and computes the
expected utility through the Choquet integral; the second, called MEU (maxmin ex-
pected utility), replaces the single (additive) prior with multiple (additive) priors and
computes expected utlility on the basis of the worst prior.
Although CEU and MEU have given an operational meaning to the concepts of
ambiguity and ambiguity attitude, they have encountered problems in providing a clear
distinction between them. One way to (partially) overcome these problems has been
recently taken in a multiple-prior setting by Ghirardato et al. (2004)6. In particular,
we follow a special case axiomatized in it called  MEU decision rule. This rule is
4The two-urn version of the experiment goes as follows: two urns are given, each of which contains
ten balls, whose color is either white or black. One of them is known to contain ve white balls and
ve black balls, while no information is given on the distribution of the ballscolors in the other urn.
The decision maker is asked to bet on the color of the rst ball drawn at random from either urn,
and must decide which urn she prefers. The paradox arises whenever people show a preference for
the knownurn, that is, for the urn containing ve white and ve black balls. This choice behavior
cannot be explained by the subjective expected utility (SEU) principle, since there is no subjective
(additive) probability distribution that supports these preferences.
5The probabilityrepresents the balance of evidence in favor of a particular proposition, while the
weight of evidencestands for the quantity of information supporting that balance.
6For a discussion of the limits of this approach see Klibano¤, Marinacci and Mukerji (2005).
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an extension of the Hurwiczs (1951)  pessimism index criterion, which computes
a  weighted sum (for  2 [0; 1]) of the maxmin expected utility (obtained via the
selection of the worst prior) and the maxmax expected utility (obtained via the selection
of the best prior). In the  MEU the ambiguity perceived by the DM is measured
by the extension of priors, while the ambiguity aversion is (positively) measured by
the coe¢ cient  (the higher it is, the higher is the weight associated with the worst
case). The MEU is of course a particular case of the  MEU in which  = 1 (that is,
in which ambiguity aversion is at its maximum). Given a utility function u, a set of











4 The neo-Schumpeterian Framework
We now briey recall the basic framework developed in Aghion and Howitt (1992).
Time is continuous and there exists a continuum of innitely lived households with
identical intertemporally additive preferences, with r representing the rate of time
preference. Since instantaneous utility is assumed to be linear and there are perfect
capital markets, then r also turns out to be the equilibrium interest rate. Households
are endowed with ow units of skilled or unskilled labor time and are assumed to supply
them inelastically in a perfectly competitive market.
There is a perfectly competitive nal sector, in which output is produced according








t 0 <  < 1
where y is nal output, x is the intermediate good and N , normalized to 1, is the
unskilled labor. A is the productivity parameter, which is assumed to evolve according
to the following rule:
At+1 = At for  > 1 and t = 0; 1; 2:::
The subscript t does not refer to calendar time (indexed by ) but to the generation
of the intermediate product that is being used. Whenever a new intermediate product
6
is introduced into the market, the economy jumps by . The intermediate good x is
produced through a one-to-one technology from skilled labor (L): The nal output is
assumed to be the numerarie: p(yt) = 1:
Before describing the innovation process, let us illustrate what happens when a
new quality is discovered: as soon as a new intermediate product is introduced, it
is automatically protected by a perfect and innitely lived patent, which allows the
inventor (or whoever buys the blueprint) to temporarily monopolize the market. With
the assumption that innovations are drastic, monopoly prots can be easily obtained






t xt   xtwt

;














The innovation process takes place because R&D rms employ, in a perfectly com-
petitive market, an amount n of skilled labor in order to gain a probability of discov-
ering the next vintage. Since skilled labor can switch from the research sector to the
intermediate sector and viceversa, the skilled labor market clearing condition can be
written as
L = xt + nt;
where xt and nt represent labor employed respectively in the intermediate and the re-
search sectors. We also dene Vt as the market value of the monopolistic rm producing
vintage t.
According to the standard Schumpeterian literature, the arrival of innovation in the
economy is assumed to follow a Poisson Process. The parameter  of this process, rep-
resenting the ow probability of an innovation, is constant and known by the investor.
Because of CRS in the research sector, the number of R&D rms is indeterminate. In
equilibrium expected benets from a unit of R&D e¤ort (Vt+1) must equal its cost
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(wt). The equation
Vt+1 = wt (2)
is usually called the research arbitrage equationof the model. Furthermore, because
instantaneous utilities are linear, agents must be indi¤erent between investing in shares
of the incumbents and investing in risk-free assets. Then the value Vt+1 must satisfy
the following asset equation:
rVt+1 = t+1   nt+1Vt+1;
where rVt+1 is the return from investing in risk-free shares, t+1 is the ow of prots
corresponding to vintage t + 1, while nt+1Vt+1 is the expected capital loss due to
the introduction of vintage t+2, and embodies the Schumpeters creative destruction





stating that the market value of the monopolistic rm producing vintage t + 1 is the
ow of prots that it will produce, discounted at the obsolescence-adjusted interest
rate7. We are now ready to modify this basic set-up so as to incorporate the agents
ignorance about the arrival rate of innovation.
5 Equilibrium R&D E¤orts under Ambiguity
For each vintage t agents hold ambiguous beliefsabout the true ow probability of
innovationt. We assume that, for each t, investors believe that  takes a strictly
positive nite value, that is to say: t 2 [m;M ] 8t wherem;M 2 ]0;+1[ andM > m8.
The width of the interval - e.g., the extension of priors - is a measure of the ambiguity
perceived by the agents. Furthermore, in our setting agents have no possibility of im-
7Notice that the  appearing in (2) and the one appearing in (3) are ldistinct, since they refer
to the productivity of R&D in discovering respectively vintages t + 1 and t + 2. It follows that the
structure of this class of models imposes that, when deciding upon R&D activity in t, investors know
the exact probabilities () of the next two vertical innovations. Of course in the standard model this
is easily satisifed because  is assumed constant.
8This assumption is meant to exclude the uninteresting cases in which the agent is either totally
hopeless about the possibility of innovating (t = 0), or absolutely sure of producing an innovation in
the exact instant in which he invests (t ! +1).
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proving their knowledge upon the parameter via a learning process, since innovations
are unique events - the probability distribution changes from an innovation to another
- and, hence, there is no statistical basis for embarking on calculations.
In the light of this assumption on the agentsbeliefs, two decision problems stated
in Section 4 must be reconsidered. The former is the problem of whether or not to
devote investments to R&D and the latter is the problem of whether to invest in shares
of the incumbents or in risk-free assets. We will study them in order under the decision
rule introduced in Section 3.
5.1 Problem 1 (The Research Arbitrage Equation)
Assume that the economy is in t (that is, assume that generation t of the intermediate
good is being produced). Under ambiguous beliefs about the value taken by t (which,
notice, represents the probability of discovering vintage t + 1), the R&D rm has to
decide whether or not to hire workers in R&D by comparing the protability associated
with these two alternatives. If the rm does not hire any R&D worker, its return will
always be null, independently of the true value of t. If it does, the cost of each R&D
investment unit is the skilled labor wage (wt), while expected benets (tVt+1) depend
on the strictly uncertain probability t 2 [m;M ]: the return from R&D investment
will then be tVt+1   wt for t 2 [m;M ].
Given this decision problem, the DM - R&D rm - adopting the  MEU decision
rule evaluates her expected returns from R&D by computing a -weighted average
of the maxmin level (also called security level, mVt+1   wt) and the maxmax level
(also called optimism level, MVt+1   wt), that is, [m+ (1  )M ]Vt+1   wt, where
0    1 is a parameter measuring the aversion to ambiguity. By comparing this
pay-o¤ with the null pay-o¤ associated with no R&D investment, indi¤erence as to
whether or not to invest in R&D can then be expressed via the following arbitrage
equation9:
wt = mVt+1 + (1  )MVt+1: (4)
9A particular case of the one above is the Gilboa-Schmeidlers (1989) maxmin criterion, in which
the DM fears that a malevolent natureis selecting the worst prior inside the set [m;M ]. The arbitrage
equation is trivially obtained from (4) by imposing  = 1.
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5.2 Problem 2 (The Market Value of Incumbents)
What is the market value of the monopolistic rm producing generation t + 1 of the
intermediate good (Vt+1)? In order to derive its expression, we need to address the
agents problem (in t+1) of whether to invest in risk-free assets or in shares of current
monopolists in the light of the strict uncertainty associated with the parameter t+1.
There are two possible acts, investing in risk-free assets or in shares of the monopolistic
rms: if the investor decides to buy risk-free assets, her return will always be rVt+1,
independently of the productivity of the research technology. On the other hand, if
she invests in shares of the incumbents, then her pay-o¤ will be t+1   t+1nt+1Vt+1,
where now t+1 represents the productivity of the R&D aimed at discovering vintage
t+ 2: the risky asset return is then a decreasing function of t+1.
For an  MEU decision maker the return associated with investing in shares is
given by the -weighted average of the maxmin level (t+1   Mnt+1Vt+1) and the
maxmax level10 (t+1  mnt+1Vt+1), while the one corresponding to investing in risk-
free assets is always rVt+1. Indi¤erence as to whether to invest in shares or in risk-
free assets is reached when these values equalize11. Then in equilibrium it must be
rVt+1 = t+1   [M + (1  )m]nt+1Vt+1 and hence12
Vt+1 =
t+1
r + [M + (1  )m]nt+1 : (5)
5.3 The Steady-State Equilibrium
In steady-state the monopolistic prots in t+ 1 are




By substituting that value into (5) and (5) into (4) we easily obtain the nal expression
for the arbitrage equation, which, together with the labor market-clearing condition,
form the system describing the evolution of this economy:
10Notice that, as opposed to problem 1, now m andM are respectively associated with the maxmax
level and the maxmin level.
11Remember that, by assumption, the DM is risk neutral.
12Once again, the maxmin solution (in the sense of Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989)) is obtained from
(5) by simply imposing  = 1.
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r + [M + (1  )m]nt+1
L = xt + nt:




r + [M + (1  )m]n
L = x+ n:
(6)
from which we can easily determine the equilibrium value of the research e¤ort13
n =
[m+ (1  )M ] 1 

L  r
[M + (1  )m] + [m+ (1  )M ]1 

: (7)
It is easy to prove that
@n
@
< 0, which means that the mass of workers employed in
R&D is a decreasing function of their ambiguity aversion. The average expected growth
rate in steady-state is given by the expected number of innovations per unit of time
multiplied by the size of the step ahead brought about by each of them. It will then be:
g = [M + (1  )m]n ln . Perhaps more interestingly, the observed growth rate of
an economy in steady-state depends on the number of innovations actually occurred -
which in turn depend on the values taken by the true parameter  and on the R&D
employment. In principle, it is then all but di¢ cult to immagine two economies, one
of which experiencing constantly higher  over time and still growing at a slower rate,
only as a result of a more conservative attitude towards uncertainty of the agents.
While comparative statics analysis for , L,  and r is in line with the original
Schumpeterian model14, the relation between the arrival rate of innovation and the
equilibrium R&D e¤orts deserves attention. In the original Schumpeterian model the
research e¤orts n are a positive function of 15. Equally, here research e¤orts are a
positive function of the estimation of the unknown arrival rate . However, the e¤ect
13The research e¤orts under pure maxmin strategy are obtained from (7) by setting  = 1.
14Both a higher quality jump  and a larger amount of skilled labor force L raise the equilibrium
R&D e¤ort n, while a higher rate of interest r, and a higher value of  (inversely measuring the
degree of market power) lower it.
15More precisely, we must distinguish between two conicting e¤ects. On the one hand, an increase
in the arrival rate makes the research activity more productive for a given level of employment, thus
stimulating the R&D e¤ort. On the other hand, this increase exacerbates the creative destruction
e¤ect, reducing the R&D e¤ort. The former e¤ect, however, dominates the latter.
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on n of an increase in ambiguity with which  is perceived, that is, of an increase in
the extension of priors [m;M ] over  is itself ambiguous: it can be positive or negative
depending on the attitude towards ambiguity: it may well happen that an increase in
ambiguity raises the R&D intensity when individuals are relatively ambiguity seeking.
The e¤ect of the ambiguity attitude has instead already been recalled above: an increase
in ambiguity aversion has a negative impact on R&D e¤orts (@n=@ < 0), which
means that an economy with a scarse tolerance of ambiguity will invest relatively little
in R&D and, given the key-role of R&D for economic growth, will coeteris paribus lag
behind another economy with a more positive attitude towards ambiguity.
6 Welfare Analysis
In this Section we compare the laissez-faire equilibrium R&D e¤ort n with the one
chosen by a social planner seeking to maximize the welfare of the representative agent
nsp . Such welfare, called Ut, is the valuation, based on the risk-free rate of time pref-
erence r, of the consumption available at all future dates. The reasoning underlying
the derivation of Ut closely resembles the one carried out to derive Vt in (3), with two
important di¤erences: rst, as the reader recalls from Section 3 where we determined
the market value of the monopolistic rm, the shareholders are only interested in the
ow of prots (t); in contrast, here consumers care about the current expected value
of their entire consumption prospect (given by the nal product yt, as a sum of both
wages and prots). Ut can actually be interpreted as the value of an asset which gives
to the owner the right to receive, as a return, the whole national income. Second, in
deriving (3) we saw that the arrival of the next innovation exercises a negative e¤ect
on the market value of the incumbent (because of its creative destruction e¤ect).
Conversely, from a social perspective the arrival of the successive innovation enhances
unambiguously the consumerswelfare, which jumps to Ut+1 = Ut, with a net collec-
tive gain equal to Ut+1 Ut = ( 1)Ut. This social gain occurs with probability n in
the unit of time, and its expected value is then n(Ut+1   Ut). As a result, the overall
return from this assetis yt + n(Ut+1   Ut), which must be equal to that obtained
under the rate r, that is
rUt = yt + n(Ut+1   Ut): (8)
The social planner, however, holds ambiguous beliefs about the true value of the
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arrival rate of innovation . Under the  MEU decision rule, and by following an
argument in all respects analogous to the one elaborated for the case of laissez-faire,
equilibrium condition (8) simply becomes
yt + [m+ (1  )M ]n(Ut+1   Ut)] = rUt:
Once substituting for yt = At(L   n) and Ut+1 = Ut, the condition above can be
solved for Ut and gives
Ut =
At(L  n)
r   [m+ (1  )M ]n(   1) :
By maximizing Ut with respect to n, we nd the socially optimal research e¤ort:
nsp =
[m+ (1  )M ](   1)1

L  r
[m+ (1  )M ](   1)1 

:
The comparison between the optimal laissez-faire research e¤ort and the socially
optimal one (that is, n vs. n
sp
 ) reveals that, as in Aghion-Howitt (1992), the former
value can be higher or lower than the latter, and exactly for the same reason. The
intertemporal spillover e¤ectand the appropriability e¤ecttend to make the laissez-
faire value lower than the socially optimal one, while the business stealing e¤ect
operates in the opposite direction: as a result, whether there is under-investment or
over-investment in R&D ultimately depends on the specic values of the parameters
involved.
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A The Uncertainty Avoidance Index
The UAI has been computed for 72 countries, by interviewing 88000 IBM employees,
from 1967 to 1973 and asking the three following questions:
1. Rule orientation: agreement with the statement Company rules should not be
broken, even when the employee thinks it is in the companys best interest(5-point
answer scale, from strongly agree to strongly disagree: the more rule-oriented, the more
uncertainty-avoiding).
2. Employment stability: employeesstatement that they intend to continue with
the company (1) for 2 years at most (2) from 2 to 5 years (3) more than 5 years (but
before retiring) (4) until they retire (the more stability-seeking, the more uncertainty-
avoiding).
3. Stress, as expressed in the mean answer to the question How often do you feel
nervous or tense at work? (5-point answer scale from I always feel this wayto I
never feel this way: the more stressed, the more uncertainty-avoiding).
The number is computed on the basis of the country mean scores for the answers
given to the questions above, and the exact formula is the following:
UAI = 300  30 (mean score rule orientation, from 1 to 5) +
 (percentage intending to stay less than 5 years, from 0 to 100) +
 40 (mean stress score, again from 1 to 5):
The index ranges from a minimum of  150 to a maximum of of +230. This kind
of experiment has been replicated over time - even using di¤erent populations, and
slightly di¤erent questions as a consequence - and the results on UAI have always been
basically conrmed (to prove the persistence over time of cultural values).
The link between the UAI and the  MEU decision rule is intuitively strong: the
UAI can roughly be considered as a proxy of the parameter  across countries, in
measuring their di¤erent degree of tolerance towards ambiguity. Although intuitively
sound, this relationship is admittedly problematic in one respect which is worth re-
marking: while our theoretical formalization can easily distinguish between ambiguity
(that is, the structural uncertainty of the decision setting measured by the width of
the interval [m;M ]) and attitude towards ambiguity (measured by the coe¢ cient ),
the UAI does not: to give a simple example, the agents answer to the employment
16
stabilityquestion is probably dictated by both her personal taste for ambiguity and
the labor market conditions of her country. With this caveat in mind, the fact remains
true that the causal mechanism highlighted in the model, according to which a fall in
the ambiguity aversion index  leads to an increase in R&D employment n, is well in
accord with the negative correlations between UAI and di¤erent measures of the R&D































































Figure 2: Source UN
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